During the last few years, there have been official attempts
to reduce
or eliminate poppy in the highlands of Thailand. The best known of
these efforts is probably the Crop Replacement and Community
Development project of the United Nations Programme for Drug Abuse
Control (UNPDAC). This was established in September 1972, following an
agreement signed between the Royal Thai Government and the U.N.
Division of Narcotic Drugs in Geneva, Switzerland. The background to
this project has been well documented elsewhere (Geddes, 1972:
224-233: United Nations Reports, 1967 and 1970; and UNPDAC First
Progress Report, July 1973). Because of this, I will confine my
discussion to the results of its implementation at Khun Wang, one of
the project's "key" White Hmong villages where the research for this
article was carried out in 1977. Project Impact: Aiming to explore the
feasibility of replacing opium with other crops and economic
enterprises, the UN project was initiated at Khun Wang in April 1973,
with the installation of a crop trial station, a team of 3 extension
workers and a number of labourers to carry out its various activities.
Since then, it has undertaken crop trials and demonstrations as well
as community development in the forms of education and medical
assistance. In its extension work between 1973 and 1977, the following
items have been loaned or made available to the tribal people for
experimentation in their farms: 16 litres of sesame seeds, 12 tangs
(1) of castor beans, 54 tangs of red-kidney beans; 1,420 kilos of
fertiliser for use with coffee trees and dry rice fields, 8,900 coffee
seedlings: 64 kilos of onion and garlic seeds, 7 kilos of insecticide;
and 66 apricot and persimmon trees. These are figures given by the
villagers. Official sources reveal: 2 tangs of castor beans, 514 kilos
of seed potatoes; 15,350 coffee seedlings; a0 apricot and persimmon
trees; 165 kilos of rice seeds, and 260 young peach trees. Land
ploughed by the project's tractor for the farmers covers: 6.4 hectare
for red-kidney beans in 1975; and 33.4 hectares for dry rice in 1975
and 1976 at the main village (2 ) . About 300 fish were also given to
two families to breed in their fish ponds. At the end of 1977, the
four households of Upper Khun Wang were loaned 40 cattle to graze of
16 hectares of improved pastures to encourage cattle raising and
modern animal husbandry as an alternative to opium growing, with the
village people being responsible for maintaining the pastures and
cattle until the latter are all repaid to the project with offsprings
of the herd's cows over a number of years.
It is obvious that the figures maintained by project personnel and
those obtained verbally from the farmers contradict one another. There
is no way to verify this, because written records are not kept on
every item handed out to the villagers. On the face of this, it is not
possible to use these figures as accurate indication of aid extended
to the opium growers. In any case, what is loaned or given does not
always bring returns, and in the long run the success of the project
can only be judged by the types and amounts of replacement crops or
economic activities the Hmong have adopted profitably as viable
alternatives to poppy, and the reduction of opium cultivation in the
area.
The results of my survey with all 30 households in the Khun Wang
complex show only one family to have earned any income from
replacement crops introduced by the UN project. This consists of 2,000
Baht in 1976 and 3,200 Baht in 1977 from coffee, and 4,000 Baht for
peaches in 1976, all sold with the assistance of project workers.
Other households also experimented with various crops and fruit trees,
but these failed or are abandoned through poor soil, heavy rains, lack
of maintenance and knowledge, or insufficient official assistance. In
the first two years of the project, households in the main village and
Upper Khun Wang were eager to join in these crop experiments so much
so that not enough seeds could be secured for them. Some were loaned
sesame seeds on the understanding that these seeds would be returned
to the project at 15% interest if the crop grew successfully. This
condition also applied to other crop seeds. The yields of potatoes and
castor beans were very good, but sesame and red-kidney beans failed
due to heavy frost. However, the people could not sell any of the
successful crops to the project, despite its original agreement to buy
them and even to compensate the growers at the rate of 800 Baht per
rai (1,600 square metres) in the event of failure from natural
causes.
After many unsuccessful attempts to sell castor beans and potatoes to
the UN project, the farmers became discouraged and gave up further
experimentations. The project did not buy these crops to sell at the
city markets on the pretext that the prices they would fetch were too
low to compensate for the costs involved in their purchase and
transportation. Between 1972 and 1978, the UN Crop Replacement Project
absorbed US $3,447,800 in expenditures for all of Thailand, and it has
reserved $40,000 annually specifically for the provision of incentives
and guarantee for village farmers who agree to take part in the
project. Yet, when it comes to buying the Hmong's experimental crops
as part of its incentive scheme, the project has not lived up to its
verbal promises to them and to its own written guidelines. Nearly all
its expenditures have gone toward salaries and official liabilities,
leaving only US $580,400 (or 18%) for general operations (Report to
the 1978 Session, U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs : 21).
After five years of implementation, it is clear that as far as Khun
Wang is concerned, United Nations substitute crops have made very
little headway to replace opium. Few farmers are growing them on any
significant level or have seen their potential as possible means of
making a living in the highlands. A detailed counting and measurement
in 1977 show only 14 households with a total of 1,445 coffee trees; 17
with 107 castor bean trees, 12 with a total of 4.710 square metres of
red-kidney beans; 6 with 16 apricot trees and 33 persimmon trees; 3
with 511 peach trees; 1 with 401 square metres of strawberries, and 1
with 303 square metres of soya beans. Peach and coffee trees planted
in 1973 have been giving fruit since 1976, and apricot trees flowered
for the first time in 1977. Castor bean trees are now only maintained
for shade or left to survive in the wild
A more meaningful aspect of the problems encountered by the UNPDAC
project is that opium land-use has remained more or less at the same
level as in the years before the initiation of the project in 1973.
The land under poppy at Khun Wang was reported as being 1.65 hectares
per household in 1972 (Roth, 1974:.33). It still stood at 1.66
hectares in 1976. From my opinion survey of the Khun Wang villagers,
35% of all households agreed that the ploughing of dry rice fields for
them by the project was the most significant undertaking, while 65%
said that not much had been achieved, apart from assistance with
medicine, educational facilities and the construction of the village
piped water system.
These figures and opinions not withstanding, an evaluation team
commissioned by the United Nations to review the project's progress in
1975 stated that since the project began, opium production in the key
experimental villages "has been reduced by about one half, and in some
cases by more" (UNPDAC, Sixth Progress Report, 1976: Annex I, p. 9).
This impression of dedicated work and success has been repeated in
later official UN reports as testimony of the project's fulfilment of
its objective in replacing poppy with other cash crops (UN PDAC,
Reports to the United Nations commission on Narcotic Drugs, 1977 and
1978 Sessions).
It is obvious that these claims must have been made in complete
disregard to the project's lack of progress at Khun Wang and other
villages. The mind boggles to think that project workers have been
able to persuade the hill tribes to grow so much strawberries and
kidney beans that opium farmers now earn two to three times more
incomes per annum than when they cultivate poppy, as was once reported
by the Thai Director of the UN project (Bangkok Post, 14/9/77, p. 3).
Yet, it was recently estimated by some officials that opium growing in
the hills of Northern Thailand had increased from previous years to
200,000 acres in 1976, and "the hill tribe economy remains as
dependent on opium sales as the junkie is on his next heroin fix
(Asian Wall Street Journal, 1/4/77, p. 1).
Persistent Patterns:
The Hmong grow poppy not only for the cash they can earn from its
sale, but also because they resort to it for many other uses. This
fact has been well appreciated in Thailand and elsewhere. In the old
days before cash has become common, opium used to be the main currency
for exchange in remote areas, especially cash since they buy most of
what they need from shops in the city.
Altogether, the socio-economic obligations of the Khun Wang villagers
entailed an annual expenditure with a cash value of 434,241 Baht in
1976 and 254,927 Baht in 1977, of which 93,051 Baht (21-4%) and 32,365
Baht (12.7%) for both years involved opium as a means of exchange. The
single biggest source of incomes is the sale of opium produced by the
village people, amounting to 422,120 Baht (85.8%) out of a total
income of 492,230 Baht for 1976, and 189,630 Baht (72%) of a total of
263,078 Baht in 1977. Taking away the total expenditures from the
annual incomes for these years leaves a yearly surplus of 57,989 Baht
for 1976 and 4,079 Baht for 1977, or 1,933 Baht and 136 Baht per
household respectively. For each of the 30 households, the gross
annual income from opium as well as other sources averages 16,407.6
Baht in 1976 and 8,769.3 Baht in 1977.
It can be inferred that these income figures are well above the annual
wages of 5,200 Baht (at 20 Baht a day for 5 working days per week) for
the lowest paid menial worker in Thailand. However, this is the
earning of one person, whereas the Hmong's figure is for a household.
For each of the 1212 Hmong workers involved in poppy cultivation at
Khun Wang, the gross annual income would be 4,068 Baht in 1976 and
2,174.2 Baht in 1977. In addition, hired workers cost 58,846 Baht in
cash terms in 1976 and 224,075 Baht in 1977. This gives us a net
income from opium sale of 363,274 Baht and 165,555 Baht respectively
or 3,002 Baht and 1,368.2 Baht per family worker for both these two
years. It is evident that this is well below the annual wages of a
Thai menial labourer. Even assuming that a Hmong spends only an
average of 215 days fully occupied in agricultural activities each
year, a daily income of 20 Baht would give him an annual gross of
4,300 Baht, which is still higher than what he actually obtains from
his farm work.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Hmonq opium growers are
comparatively better off than other low-income earners, especially
when more than half of the households do not produce enough for their
needs. In 1976, for instance, 14 of the 30 households in Khun Wang had
a total deficit of 61,011 Baht or 4,358 Baht per household, and 18 of
these households in 1977 overspent by 44,870 Baht or 2,493 Baht per
household. This resulted in many of them being forced to borrow from
relatives or traders in order to sustain themselves until the next
crop harvest.
In general, the biggest need is rice, since it absorbs the highest
expenditures with a total money value of 125,606 Baht in 1976 and
85,013 Baht in 1977, representing 28.9% and 33.3% of all expenditures
respectively. This is despite the fact that rice production in Khun
Wang totalled 40,359.2 kilos in 1967 in unmilled form and 42,219 kilos
for these years. The amount of paddy purchased to supplement
home-grown rice is 29.582.4 kilos in 1967 and 21,253.25 kilos in 1977.
This means that 42% of rice consumed in 1976 and 33% in 1977 had to be
bought to meet the villagers' requirements. This is because some of
this rice was also used for domestic animals, due to insufficient
maize production. In 1976, the maize yield was 13,050 kilogrammes for
all 30 households, of which 1,000 kilos were sold for 1,600 Baht. The
remaining 12,050 kilos were kept as animal feeds. With an average
daily consumption of 60 kilos of maize by the village pigs and
chickens, some households had enough maize to last till the following
year while the majority had to substitute rice as fodder when their
maize run out, often within 2 months following harvest.
With such demand made on rice by both domestic animals and people, it
is not surprising that the Hmong cannot produce enough paddy to last a
whole year. The situation is made worse by the lack of land for rice
growing as Khun Wang is at too high an altitude for rice to grow well.
To complicate matters further, the incomes of the opium farmers are
always in a precarious position, depending on the fluctuation in opium
price and their in times of low yields.
It has been said the one of the reasons for the continuing cultivation
of poppy in the hills is the farmers' indebtedness to lowland or local
shopkeepers. In times of economic hardship, a farmer is forced to seek
loans which he will repay in opium that credit operators later sell at
lucrative prices to heroin dealers. Interest on these loans is often
at the rate of 200 per cent a year. If the farmer cannot settle his
debts immediately, they are carried over to the following years for at
least three years. This may tie him to his opium fields until he can
produce enough to satisfy his creditors. In 1976, the Hmong of Khun
Wang repaid debts totalling 39,316 Baht of which 27,516 (70%) were in
opium. In 1977, their debt repayment amounted to 18,310 Baht of which
14,320 Baht (78.2%) were paid in opium (1). It is obvious that many
farmers paid their credit agents with opium, either by choice or
compulsion. However, as Geddes points out, it is probably exaggerating
"to say that these ties to agents who are primarily interested in
obtaining opium actually stimulate production, because there are other
reasons why the people at present want to grow it, but they would tend
to make it more difficult to abandon production" (Geddes, 1976; 225).
Another reason for the Hmong's opium cultivation is the need to
provide for their family addicts. Without incomes, those who are
dependent on opium for smoking cannot buy it from other growers so
that they or their families have to produce it themselves. Khun Wang
has 26 addicts of whom 19 (including 5 couples) have economically
active household members who grow enough poppy for them to have opium
for use throughout the year before the next harvest. Those without
such labour resources do not have enough to smoke for a year and have
to borrow or earn opium from hiring their labour to other households.
Among the latter group, one has enough opium for 7 months, four (2
couples) for 6 months, and two (a very destitute couple) for 2 months.
The opium reserved for smoking by village addicts or for home uses
totals 137.16 kilogrammes worth 128,662 Baht in 1977 with a cash
related expense for analgesic powder (used to mix with opium) of 2,776
Baht. The cash value of opium used by these addicts is so high as to
be second only to the total expenditure on rice.
The average length of addiction for these 26 opium-dependent Hmong is
14.5 years, with an average daily consumption of 7-75 grams per addict
or 73.55 kilos a year tor all addicts. This is well below the reserve
figure of 137-16 kilos for the whole village, but some households
usually keep more opium than they actually use in order to meet
emergencies. Like their expenditures this amount of opium fluctuates
according to the level of production: the more opium produced in any
one year, the. more opium is used or reserved for smoking and home
consumption.
It is clear that one of the main justification by the Hmong for their
poppy cultivation is the need to provide opium for their addicts. They
may give up growing poppy as a cash crop, but will not abandon it
altogether because a limited supply will always be required until the
time when they have no one dependent on it. At this stage, the tribal
addicts are still too reluctant to join the government's modest
detoxification scheme in the lowlands, explaining that it is difficult
to give away their habit now after such a long time on the drug. They
realize the futility of being successfully treated in the city only to
return to their isolated villages in the hills where the lack of
medical service will force many of them to take up opium smoking again
as the only alternative to alleviating any sickness.
Many hill people can today buy medicine for their own use,
supplemented by free medical assistance from government or voluntary
health officers who visit a few tribal villages two or three times a
year. However, this ad hoc visiting means that highlanders have to
resort to opium in case of serious illness such as toothache,
influenza and diarrhoea. This can be either in the form of raw opium
taken orally, or opium smoke inhaled by the patients or blown at them
under the cover of a blanket. In 1977, there were 147 incidences of
diarrhoea in Khun Wang, 322 of influenza and 272 of toothache, with
568 instances of less serious stomach complaints for the total
population of 254 persons. Cash used to buy modern medicine amounts to
3,432 Baht and another 3,307 Baht (much of it in opium) were spent on
curing rites. Of the 26 existing addicts, 24 (92.3%) give a major
sickness as the cause of their addiction. It is not possible to
estimate the amount of opium used for pain-relief, but there is no
doubt that it is still being resorted to widely among the highland
villagers.
With some permanent health service available, it is unlikely that the
Hmong will depend on opium in their illness to the extent of becoming
addicted. The hill farmers do not always have the fares to go to the
city hospitals, nor can they afford the time even when treatment for
them is free. So long as they rely on opium as pain-killer and so long
as their addicts are not rehabilitated, they will carry on producing
opium, irrespective of the government's decisions on its legal
standing. An integrated approach by many governments agencies
providing major services which cater for the farmers' needs in all
areas is required.
Constraints and Prospects:
If the UNPDAC project has not done much to decrease the Hmong's opium
production in Thailand, the Forestry Department of the Royal Thai
Government certainly has made its presence increasingly felt in the
highlands. In order to prevent erosion and further forest destruction
by hill farmers, the Forestry Department through its Watershed
Management Division has undertaken the reforestation of all denuded
lands and fallows with no ongoing farming. In the Khun Wang area,
663.68 hectares had been planted with trees between 1975 and 1977,
with 320 hectares planned for each subsequent year. A farmer can apply
to use his own fallows for crop growing; but as soon as they are not
under any crop, Forest Department labourers plant trees on them. This
even includes fruit tree plantations which are not well maintained,
and suspected of being abandoned by their owners. Since there is no
virgin forest left to clear, all farming has to depend on fallows or
old crop fields. There is no doubt that the Hmong will not be able to
grow crops or graze their cattle as reforestation gradually takes
place on all uncultivated lands in the region. For the time being,
they can still rely on about 320 hectares of poppy fallows recently
abandoned by Northern Thai growers beyond the current boundaries of
the reforestation project, although these will not last them for
long.
One likely consequence of this lack of agricultural land is that
tribal opium production may stop or diminish as the reforestation of
the hills confines the farmers to their existing poppy fields with no
possibility of expansion elsewhere. In a way, this is an indirect way
of forcing the highland settlers to adopt permanent methods of
cultivation and give up their traditional shifting agriculture or
intermittent migration. The use of force through law enforcement to
put an end to poppy growing has sometimes been suggested (UNPDAC,
Sixth Progress Report, 1976: Annex I, p. 8). The direct application of
force, however, has not so far been done by the Royal Thai Government
as it may cause socio-economic hardship to tribal communities which
have yet to be provided with viable alternatives to opium.
What has been attempted is the suppression of opium trafficking in the
country by imposing harsh penalties and even death sentences on drug
peddlers in the hope of depriving poppy farmers of their market. This
is a cautious and politically expedient move, but it still does not
prevent traders from finding means to buy tribal opium in one way or
another. It merely changes the pattern: whereas before traders went
together in larger groups with guards and horses, they now make
contact with growers in small groups of two or four persons, usually
working for a big lowland dealer.
Except for the occasional Hmong, the majority of opium traders are
Northern Thai who are well acquainted with tribal people and who know
that the latter will not inform the authorities on their illegal
activities. In the course of my research, I observed no less than 9
groups of these traders totalling 32 persons travelling through Khun
Wang at different times in search of opium to buy. There could have
been others, because many only visited at night and could not be seen.
Those who did come during the day seldom make casual conversation with
anyone and do not take the trails frequently by ordinary travellers,
preferring to use by-ways known only to them. Despite such precautious
measures on their part, six Hmong traders were known to be apprehended
in 1977 and given sentences ranging from 6 to 20 years in prison.
However, no Northern Thai traders were heard to have shared this
fate.
The severe punishment handed down to opium dealers may prove effective
to a point in eliminating markets for opium farmers and may prevent
them from producing more of the crop. Nevertheless, the use of the
police to intercept traders and to deter growers in the hills is not
effective when all the law-enforcement officers live in the lowlands
and are only sent to tribal villages for very short reconnaissance
missions. No surveillance has been undertaken on a permanent basis in
accordance with the Royal Thai Government's informal policy of not to
enforce the law to prohibit opium cultivation, as this may alienate
villagers from the formal leadership of the country. In 1977, two
groups of 18 policemen and members of the Thai border Patrol Police
visited Khun Wang to survey the Hmong's opium fields and to look for
traders. In order not to arouse suspicion, they informed the village
people that they were only there to find insurgents and some of the
policemen proceeded to search the Hmong's bedrooms for unregistered
rifles. On both occasions, no insurgents or traders were found.
At present, it would appear that the opium economy of the hill
settlers is in a precarious position. Many forces are exerting their
influence directly or indirectly on its existence. The prospects for
continuing dependence on poppy as a major agricultural undertaking are
now dim, especially when reinforced by the scarcity of good quality
lands and overpopulation. We have seen the importance of rice for the
Hmong and their adoption of opium as a mean of exchange for rice. As
pointed out by McKennon, for the highlanders "it is rice that is
valued above all other crops... Rice is not only important as a food
crop set about by ritual, good harvests provide a household's
subsistence needs and grant an enviable degree of independence" (1977:
5). Without wet rice terraces to produce paddy on a permanent basis,
the economy of the poppy farmers will greatly suffer unless it can
rely on other crops to sustain the people. So far, crops introduced by
the United Nations Crop Replacement Project have not adapted well to
the highlands or are without marketing outlets on any meaningful
scale. So long as this remains the case, opium seems to be the only
alternative for survival, despite the many constraints against its
production and the admission of the growers themselves that they wish
to give it up.
Above all, what is most urgently called for is the improvement of the
people's existing rice production and subsistence economy. As they are
at present, tribal development projects seem to regard traditional
highland agriculture as obsolete and ecologically destructive, thereby
preferring to introduce commercial agriculture to the hill tribes
whose access to modern marketing and agricultural methods need to be
seriously questioned. Because they are often based on naive
assumptions, official projects are mainly providing livelihood for
bureaucrats and academics to try out their pet ideas. They rarely meet
the farmers needs, with the result that the latter will continue with
opium production as the only viable means of making a living when they
have no other places to live.
Conclusion:
Hill tribespeople produce opium in order to have a means of obtaining
sufficient food since they can only produce 60 per cent of their
requirement, due to lack of rice land. Moreover, opium plays an
important role in the alleviation of their illness. For these reasons,
the Hmong have to depend on poppy cultivation as the most practical
way of surviving in the highlands, despite their aversion to it. They
would rather own wet rice fields so that they can settle permanently
in one place than being forced to follow their present system of
shifting agriculture. Hmong opium production is a problem of multiple
dimensions, not only to governments but also to the growers
themselves. The highlands of Northern Thailand have proved unsuitable
for many crops introduced to replace poppy, and the lack of markets
makes many farmers reluctant to commit themselves to the new crops.
Unless means are found to increase their existing food production,
they have little alternative but to produce opium for a living,
especially when there is a scarcity of land for other crops. It is not
the lack of market alone which prevents hill farmers from adopting
legal cash crops in place of poppy, but also the problem of
landlessness. These are the main issues which should preoccupy poppy
replacement officials, instead of continuing doggedly with
experimentation on alternative inedible/nonmarketable crops and making
wild claims about their success with the farmers as they do at
present.